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A Kochen-Specker Theorem for Imprecisely Specified Measurements
N. David Mermin
Laboratory of Atomic and Solid State Physics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-2501
A recent claim that finite precision in the design of real experiments “nullifies” the impact of the
Kochen-Specker theorem, is shown to be unsupportable, because of the continuity of probabilities
of measurement outcomes under slight changes in the experimental configuration.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Bz, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Lx
The Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem is one of the major
no-hidden-variables theorems of quantum mechanics. It
exhibits a finite set of finite-valued observables with the
following property: there is no way to associate with each
observable in the set a particular one of its eigenvalues
so that the eigenvalues associated with every subset of
mutually commuting observables obey certain algebraic
identities obeyed by the observables themselves [1]. Such
a set of observables is traditionally called uncolorable.
The physical significance of an uncolorable set of ob-
servables stems from the fact that a simultaneous mea-
surement of a mutually commuting set must yield a set of
simultaneous eigenvalues, which are constrained to obey
the algebraic identities obeyed by the observables them-
selves. So any attempt to assign every observable in a KS
uncolorable set a preexisting noncontextual value (a “hid-
den variable”) that is simply revealed by a measurement,
will necessarily assign to at least one mutually commut-
ing subset of observables a set of values specifying results
that quantum mechanics forbids.
The term “noncontextual” emphasizes that the dis-
agreement with quantum mechanics only arises if the
value associated with each observable is required to be
independent of the choice of the other mutually commut-
ing observables with which it is measured. Contextual
value assignments in full agreement with all quantum
mechanical constraints can, in fact, be made. The im-
port of the KS theorem is that there exist sets of observ-
ables — “uncolorable sets” — for which any assignment
of preexisting values must be contextual if all the out-
comes specified by those values are allowed by the laws
of quantum mechanics. The theorem prohibits noncon-
textual hidden-variable theories that agree with all the
quantitative predictions of quantum mechanics.
Meyer [2] and Kent [3] have questioned the relevance of
the KS theorem to the outcomes of real imperfect labo-
ratory experiments, by constructing some clever noncon-
textual assignments of eigenvalues to every observable in
a dense subset of observables, whose closure contains the
KS uncolorable observables. While no KS uncolorable
set can be contained in such a dense colorable subset,
observables in the dense colorable subset can be found
arbitrarily close to every observable in any KS uncol-
orable set. This leads Meyer and Kent to assert that their
noncontextual value assignments to dense sets of observ-
ables “nullify” the KS theorem. In support of this claim
they note that observables measured in an actual exper-
iment cannot be specified with perfect precision so, in
Kent’s words, “no Kochen-Specker-like contradiction can
rule out hidden variable theories indistinguishable from
quantum theory by finite precision measurements. . . .” [4]
I show below that this plausible-sounding but not en-
tirely sharply formulated intuition dissolves under close
scrutiny [5]. First I describe how the KS conclusion
that quantum mechanics requires any assignment of pre-
existing values to be contextual can be deduced directly
from the data, even when one is not sure precisely which
observables are actually being measured. Then I identify
where the intuition of Meyer and Kent goes astray.
At first glance it is not evident that either a KS uncol-
orable set or a Meyer-Kent (MK) dense colorable set of
observables is relevant when one cannot specify to more
than a certain high precision what observables are ac-
tually being measured. As traditionally viewed, the KS
theorem merely makes a point about the formal struc-
ture of quantum mechanics, telling us that there is no
consistent way to interpret the theory in terms of the
statistical behavior of an ensemble, in each individual
member of which every observable in the theory has a
unique noncontextual value waiting to be revealed by any
appropriate measurement. Upon further reflection, how-
ever, there emerges a straightforward way to apply the
result of the KS theorem to measurements specified with
high but imperfect precision, which makes it evident that
the theorem and its various descendants remain entirely
relevant to imperfect experiments, while the ingenious
constructions of Meyer and Kent do not.
Let us first rephrase the implications of the KS theorem
in the ideal case of perfectly specified measurements. The
theorem gives a finite uncolorable set of observables, each
with a finite number of eigenvalues. Because the number
of possible assignments of noncontextual values to ob-
servables in the set is finite, no matter what probabilities
are used to associate such values with the observables,
the assignment must give nonzero probability to at least
one mutually commuting subset of the observables having
values that disagree with the laws of quantum mechan-
ics. So if noncontextual preexisting values existed and
if one could carry out a series of ideal experiments [6] in
each of which one measured a randomly selected subset of
perfectly defined mutually commuting observables from
a KS uncolorable set, then a definite nonzero fraction of
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those measurements would produce results violating the
laws of quantum mechanics.
Conversely, if an appropriately large number of such
randomly selected measurements all yielded results satis-
fying the relevant quantum mechanical constraints, then
in the absence of bizarre conspiratorial correlations be-
tween one’s random choice of which mutually commuting
subset to measure and the hypothetical preexisting non-
contextual values waiting to be revealed by that measure-
ment, one would have established directly from the ideal
data that there could be no preexisting noncontextual
values.
In a real experiment, of course, the observables can-
not be precisely specified. The actual apparatus used
to measure any mutually commuting subset of an uncol-
orable finite set of observables will be slightly misaligned
at all stages of the measuring process. Therefore the
pointer readings from which one deduces their discrete
simultaneous values will give slightly unreliable informa-
tion about the ideal observables one was trying to mea-
sure. If the misalignment is at the limit of ones abil-
ity to control or discern, as it will be in a well designed
experiment, then one can and will label the outcomes
of such a procedure with the same discrete eigenvalues
used to label the gedanken outcomes of the ideal per-
fectly aligned measurement. The misalignment will only
reveal itself through the occasional occurrence of runs
with outcomes that the laws of quantum mechanics pro-
hibit for a perfectly aligned apparatus [7]. But although
the outcomes deduced from such imperfect measurements
will occasionally differ dramatically from those allowed in
the ideal case, if the misalignment is very slight, the sta-
tistical distribution of outcomes will differ only slightly
from the ideal case.
It is this continuity of quantum mechanical probabili-
ties under small variations in the experimental configu-
ration (without which quantum mechanics, or, for that
matter, any other physical theory, would be quite useless)
that makes the KS conclusion relevant to the imperfect
case. Even though the apparatus cannot be perfectly
aligned, if quantum mechanics is correct in its quantita-
tive predictions, then the fraction of runs which violate
the quantum-mechanical rules applying to the ideal ob-
servables can be made arbitrarily small in the realistic
case by making the alignment sufficiently sharp. But
the KS theorem tells us that if the possible results of
the ideal gedanken measurements were consistent with
preexisting noncontextual values, then the fraction of
quantum-mechanically forbidden outcomes for the real
experiments would have to approach a nonzero limit as
the alignment became sharp.
By making the experimental misalignment sufficiently
small, one can make the statistics of the slightly unreli-
able results of the randomly selected realistic measure-
ments arbitrarily close to the statistics of the theoreti-
cal results of the randomly selected ideal measurements.
Therefore a failure in the realistic case to observe suffi-
ciently many values that contradict the constraints im-
posed on the data by quantum mechanics can demon-
strate, just as effectively as the failure to observe any
such contradictions in the ideal case, that if the measure-
ments are revealing preexisting values, then those values
must be contextual .
Because it can be stated in terms of outcome probabil-
ities, and because those probabilities must vary continu-
ously with variations in the experimental apparatus, the
conclusion of the KS theorem are not “nullified” by the
finite precision with which actual measurements can be
specified.
But what about Meyer’s and Kent’s intuition that the
dense colorable MK set can be used to furnish a group of
nearly ideal experiments with noncontextual values that
agree with the constraints imposed by quantum mechan-
ics on all mutually commuting ideal subsets? The cru-
cial word here is “all”. It is impossible for a colorable
set of observables in one-to-one correspondence with the
observables in a KS uncolorable set, to have mutually
commuting subsets that correspond to every mutually
commuting subset of the KS uncolorable set. At least
one of those subsets cannot be mutually commuting [8].
This impossibility is established by the KS theorem
itself, which uses only the topology of the network of
links between commuting observables in the full KS un-
colorable set. This topology would be preserved by the
correspondence between the nearby colorable and uncol-
orable sets, if the correspondence between their mutually
commuting subsets were complete. Because, as Meyer
and Kent explicitly show, the MK set is colorable, the
correspondence cannot be complete.
Thus any finite MK colorable set in sufficiently close
one-to-one correspondence with a finite KS uncolorable
set, must necessarily lack the full range of mutually com-
muting subsets that the KS uncolorable one contains.
There is therefore at least one mutually commuting sub-
set of the KS uncolorable set for which the MK colorable
set fails to provide a set of values agreeing with the con-
straints imposed by quantum mechanics. It is only this
deficiency that makes it possible to color the observables
in the MK set in a noncontextual way that satisfies the
quantum mechanical constraints for all mutually com-
muting subsets. But this same deficiency makes the MK
set useless for specifying preassigned noncontextual val-
ues agreeing with quantum mechanics for the outcomes
of every one of the slightly imperfect experiments that
corresponds to measuring a mutually commuting subset
of observables from the ideal KS uncolorable set.
If one tries to bridge this gap in the argument by asso-
ciating more than a single nearby MK colorable observ-
able with some of the observables in the ideal uncolorable
set, one sacrifices the noncontextuality of the value as-
signments. Nor does the MK “nullification” of the KS
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theorem work in a toy universe in which the physically
allowed observables are restricted to be those in the dense
colorable set. In such a universe measurements still could
not be specified with perfect precision, and one would
still have to rely on the continuity of outcome proba-
bilities with small changes in the experimental configu-
ration to relate the theory to actual imperfect observa-
tions. Under such conditions it would be highly conve-
nient to introduce fictitious observables which were the
limit points of physical observables in the dense colorable
set, whose statistics could represent to high accuracy the
statistics of physically allowed observables in their im-
mediate vicinity. The KS theorem would hold for these
fictitious limit-point observables, and would therefore ap-
ply by continuity to measurements of the nearby physical
observables, for exactly the reasons I have just described
in the case of conventional quantum mechanics with its
continuum of observables. Indeed, I can see no grounds
other than convenience (which is, of course, so enormous
as to be utterly compelling) for treating the whole con-
tinuum of observables as physically real, as we actually
do, rather than regarding it as a fictitious extension of
some countable dense subset of observables.
So contrary to the claim of Meyer and Kent, the KS
theorem is not nullified by the finite precision of real ex-
perimental setups because of the fundamental physical
requirement that probabilities of outcomes of real ex-
periments vary only slightly under slight variations in
the configuration of the experimental apparatus, and be-
cause the import of the theorem can be stated in terms of
whether certain outcomes never occur, or occur a definite
nonzero fraction of the time in a set of randomly chosen
ideal experiments.
But the elegant MK colorings of dense sets of ob-
servables make an instructive contribution to our un-
derstanding of the KS theorem, by forcing us to recog-
nize that a principle of continuity of physical probability,
obeyed by the quantum theory, plays an essential role
in relating the conclusions of the theorem to real exper-
iments. Indeed, the relationship between the MK dense
colorable sets and the KS uncolorable set offers a novel
perspective on why it is sensible to base physics on real
(as opposed to rational) numbers, in spite of the finite
precision of actual experimental arrangements.
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